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Abstract 
The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s 
reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as 
proposed in her book What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of 
Philosophy. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts 
forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty. 
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It is a great honor for me to have been invited to participate in this 
symposium on Penelope Maddy’s book with such distinguished colleagues. 
Indeed, Maddy and Barry Stroud have been two of my philosophical heroes 
since I started being interested in analytic philosophy over twenty years ago. 
Stroud’s book, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (1984), was 
inspirational and shaped my philosophical interests ever since I read it. 
Maddy’s work on the philosophy of mathematics, naturalism and the take-
home message of Wittgenstein’s reflections on The Logical Must (Maddy 
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2014) has always been an important source of inspiration for my own work 
and thinking on these issues. I would also like to thank Adam Leite for 
inviting me to participate in the symposium and for being such a stimulating 
philosophical interlocutor over the years. 
What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy is an 
incredibly original and thought-provoking book. It is also an extremely 
ambitious piece of work, since it knits together two of the hardest topics in 
philosophy—i.e. skepticism and meta-philosophy. And it does so admirably, 
with a clear and approachable style. 
In my comments, I would like to concentrate on Chapter 3 of the book. 
But before delving into more specific comments, let me just offer a brief 
overview of that chapter and of what I will be arguing for. 
2 Overview 
Chapter 3 focuses on the philosophy of common sense, particularly on G.E. 
Moore and on Wittgenstein. Maddy thinks highly of Moore’s strategy, which 
is much more subtle than what meets the eye. In fact, as she reconstructs it, it 
depends on insisting, contra a skeptic or a philosopher moved by skepticism, 
that one can know things, such as that there is a hand here, and that there is 
another one there, even if one cannot prove that, because one cannot prove 
one is not dreaming. Furthermore, Moore’s strategy consists in pointing out 
that he has perfectly good evidence of being awake and yet this evidence 
would not satisfy the opponent, since the latter is concerned with 
“extraordinary dreaming” (2017: 31) rather than ordinary dreaming. Yet, 
according to Maddy, the moral of Moore’s Proof seems to be that following 
the opponent on the demand of being able to exclude extraordinary 
dreaming to grant knowledge is misguided. 
I will raise some questions with respect to this reconstruction of Moore’s 
strategy, although there is much I agree with Maddy on that. 
In the same chapter, she proposes a novel—therapeutic—interpretation 
of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. If I understood her correctly, contrary to so-
called ‘framework’ readings of On Certainty, Maddy thinks that Wittgenstein 
was not proposing any positive view, or theory, concerning “hinge 
propositions,” but merely aimed at re-habilitating common sense, or perhaps 
better, the ordinary use of ‘know’, even in connection with hinge 
propositions. In this sense, he was much closer to Moore than he thought 
and in fact much of his critique of Moore was based on a misunderstanding 
of what the latter was really after. 
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Here is probably where Maddy and I are more in disagreement. Not 
because I think Wittgenstein was proposing a theory of hinges, but because I 
think there is good evidence to claim that he was not in favor of 
rehabilitating the ordinary use of ‘know’ with respect to hinges, at all. Rather, 
he thought that under the superficial similarity, the use of ‘I know’ with 
respect to hinges had to be taken to be “grammatical” (OC 58) and thus not as 
stating an epistemic relation obtaining between a subject and a proposition 
(or a fact), but as expressing something else. 
Finally, the chapter closes with a comparison between science and math 
on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. According to Maddy, math 
and science target imprecise theoretical concepts, which are then refined in 
the light of extensive knowledge of the relevant field of inquiry. Fruitfulness 
with respect to criteria internal to the discipline is the meter of success in 
math, while in the empirical sciences it is the removal of apparent 
contradictions between theory and empirical findings. 
Philosophy, in contrast, targets everyday concepts. The methodology 
usually consists in proposing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, in 
raising counter-examples, and then in refining those conditions until no false 
positives or negatives emerge. The criterion of success is to track phenomena 
or an essence that those concepts supposedly refer to. Maddy is very 
skeptical of this methodology and recommends engaging in more ordinary 
language investigations and in therapeutic and also more naturalist-oriented 
philosophy. 
Here I am very much in agreement with Maddy on her description and 
evaluation. However, I am generally less inclined towards naturalism than 
she is, and I would insist that a systematic, yet pluralistic philosophy could 
still be pursued, once it is realized that there is no essence of, say, truth, 
knowledge or justification to be investigated with particularly powerful 
spectacles that only philosophers would allegedly possess. 
3 Moore 
As anticipated, there is a lot I agree with in Maddy’s reconstruction of Moore. 
Indeed, I have defended a very similar reading in print. However, I have also 
been puzzled by several things Moore did say, which do not obviously square 
with it. Let me explain. 
In his “Reply to My Critics,” Moore unequivocally claims: 
I have sometimes distinguished between two different propositions, 
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each of which has been made by some philosophers, namely (1) the 
proposition ‘There are no material things’ and (2) the proposition 
‘Nobody knows for certain [my italics] that there are any material 
things’. And in … “Proof of an External World” (…) I implied with regard 
to the first of these propositions that it could be proved to be false in 
such a way as this; namely, by holding up one of your hands and saying 
‘This hand is a material thing; therefore there is at least one material 
thing’. But with regard to the second of these propositions, which has, I 
think, been far more commonly asserted than the first, I do not think I 
ever implied that it could be proved to be false in any such simple way 
(…). 
MOORE 1942: 668 
So Moore did not think of his proof as an anti-skeptical one. His target was 
idealism, not skepticism. And in the “Proof of the External World” itself he 
candidly admitted that addressing skepticism would require proving the 
premises of his proof. That, in turn, would require proving that he wasn’t 
dreaming and he admitted not to be able to do it. Here is the passage: 
How am I to prove now that ‘Here is one hand, and here’s another?’ I do 
not believe I can do it. In order to do it, I should need to prove for one 
thing, as Descartes pointed out, that I am not now dreaming. But how 
can I prove that I am not? I have, no doubt, conclusive reasons for 
asserting that I am not now dreaming; I have conclusive evidence that I 
am awake: but that is a very different thing from being able to prove it. 
MOORE 1939: 150 
Notice that here Moore is not objecting to the Cartesian challenge—that is, 
the challenge of proving that he isn’t dreaming. On the contrary, he is saying 
that if he had to give a proof of his premises he should answer that challenge. 
Since, fortunately, he does not have to give a proof of his premises, since he is 
not addressing skepticism but idealism, he can avoid addressing it. Notice, 
furthermore, that he is not attempting to demote the challenge. That is, he is 
perfectly aware that that challenge involves “extraordinary dreaming,” as 
Maddy (2017: 31) calls it, rather than ordinary dreaming. And yet he is not 
saying anything against its legitimacy. 
Now, we do know that in later writings, particularly “Certainty” and “Four 
Forms of Scepticism,” he revisited the Cartesian challenge and proposed 
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what is known as Moore’s gambit, as well as considerations in favor of the 
greater rationality of sticking to our ordinary beliefs. Yet we also know he was 
not happy with these writings, which only appeared posthumously. 
Nevertheless, he also says in “Proof of an External World” (Moore 1939: 150) 
that he knows things which he cannot prove, such as the premises of his 
proof. 
So the Cartesian challenge is intelligible, legitimate, and unanswerable, for 
Moore. Yet, it does not impugn knowledge of ordinary truths such as “Here is 
my hand” because—in a proto-externalist spirit—Moore is advancing the 
idea that knowledge does not entail proof of one’s knowledge or being able to 
show how or that one knows. 
Thus, Moore is not just insisting that common sense has it right and 
Descartes has it wrong, in the sense of raising a challenge which is somewhat 
misguided or irrelevant, once one is deeply and healthily rooted in common 
sense. Rather, he is making a typically epistemological move of denying the 
underlying principle on which the Cartesian challenge—as unanswerable as 
it is—would jeopardize ordinary knowledge. That is, through the 
endorsement of the famous (or infamous) KK principle: 
 KK K KK  
For that principle is key to going from 
(1) If one cannot prove one is not dreaming, one cannot prove to know 
that P (e.g. “Here is a hand”), 
which Moore, as we have just seen, does grant, to 
(2) One does not know that there is a hand here (via contraposition & 
KK). 
Some motivation for denying KK does come from considering common sense 
superior to any other philosophical pretension or request. But that very move 
could be defended, and has been defended differently after all (for instance, 
by appealing to cases like those of children and the unsophisticated to show 
how K does not entail KK). 
I am not convinced this move is ultimately decisive against skepticism, 
since a skeptic could either reject its legitimacy, or, in a less question-begging 
way, insist on the second-order challenge that she could still raise and that 
would go unanswered by Moore’s lights. That is, a skeptic could grant 
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knowledge of ordinary empirical propositions and yet ask the opponent to be 
able to claim or to prove it. Indeed, it seems to me that Moore himself, for all 
we have seen so far, understood the skeptical challenge that way: not as 
targeting knowledge of “Here is a hand” per se, but our right to claim it—
whence the insistence that he was confronting idealism, not skepticism; that 
he knew his premises and therefore the conclusion of his argument; and, yet, 
that to address skepticism he should have proved his premises. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that Moore, as Maddy rightly remarks, is not 
just a Plain Man. He is a philosopher, who makes very interesting and quite 
sophisticated moves, even when their motivation comes from an alignment 
with common sense. It is also clear that he is totally cognizant of the 
Cartesian skeptical challenge, which he takes seriously and in its full 
complexity, even if, thanks to his proto-externalism, he is able to defuse 
some—not all—of its devastating consequences, by making knowledge of 
ordinary propositions, like “Here is my hand,” immune to it. 
4 Wittgenstein and What Philosophers Should Do 
I agree with Maddy that Wittgenstein was pursuing largely therapeutic ends 
in his later writings, including On Certainty. We disagree, I think, on the 
scope and the results of this therapy. In my reading of Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty, he was equally critical of skepticism and of Moore. He objected to 
the former by insisting that he would transgress the boundaries of sense by 
raising doubts which would be global (or “from scratch,” as Maddy (2017: 37) 
calls them); that would not make any difference in practice; that would not 
be based on grounds but merely on conceivable hypotheses at best; that 
would not belong to any of our ordinary empirical inquiries within which 
legitimate doubts can arise and may possibly be solved by appealing to 
various kinds of evidence, thanks to taking many things for granted.1 He also 
objected to the intelligibility of the hypothesis from dreaming, by arguing 
that if we were to dream it, we would not be using meaningful words (OC 
383), after all, since their employment would be completely severed from the 
ordinary circumstances which solely provide the criteria for their meaningful 
employment. Thus, the hypothesis from dreaming is either self-defeating, 
because, if we were dreaming, we would be dreaming of it, and our words 
 
1 For a more detailed analysis of all these objections, see Coliva (2010: Ch. 3). 
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would only retain an appearance of meaning; or else it is false, if we are not 
in fact dreaming and are actually entertaining it.2 
Although I myself would not espouse this anti-skeptical strategy,3 it seems 
very much in keeping with the kind of analysis of ordinary language Maddy 
seems to be keen on. Yet, the analysis extends beyond language to ordinary 
and scientific epistemic practices, and—yes—it involves recognizing that 
these practices rest on ungrounded presuppositions. Yet, those 
presuppositions are of the essence of those very practices (OC 341–344). This 
is indeed a kind of discovery—even though certainly not a theory—we 
make, according to Wittgenstein, by paying attention to the “logic,” as he 
calls it, of our empirical and scientific investigations. 
However, Wittgenstein also objected to Moore’s use of ‘I know’ in 
connection with his truisms and the premises of his proof, on the grounds 
that he would not have reasons in support of his claims to knowledge; and 
that in fact he would have no reasons stronger than what they were supposed 
to ground; or that no investigation could be legitimately be carried out to 
establish that things are as he claimed them to be; that his use of ‘I know’ 
would not be relevant in the communicative context at hand; and, finally, 
that in that kind of context, it would not make sense to doubt or to deny that 
one knows.4 Thus, Wittgenstein was against Moore the philosopher of 
common sense and his use of ‘I know’, as much as he was against the skeptic 
and his use of ‘to doubt’. 
Yet, he also put forward the view that with respect to Moore’s truisms, and 
the premises of his proof, as well as many other hinge propositions, the use 
we may make of ‘I know’ in our ordinary language would actually be 
“grammatical” (OC 58). So we—Plain Men and Women—do use ‘I know’ in 
connection with those propositions. Yet, despite the identical linguistic form, 
those words do not mean the same as ‘I know’ in “I know that my kids are at 
 
2 The similarity between Wittgenstein’s anti-Cartesian strategy in On Certainty (1969) and 
Putnam’s in “Brains in a Vat” (1981) is striking. I have not been able to find any evidence, 
however, that Putnam was inspired by the reading of On Certainty. Putnam does mention 
Wittgenstein in his celebrated paper, but only the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953), in connection with the idea that signs by themselves (and even mental 
images) do not mean anything, even when they resemble their alleged references. He also 
mentions the relevance of this Wittgensteinian idea to his own work on the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem, but he refers only to the Philosophical Investigations. 
3 I have developed an alternative anti-skeptical strategy in Coliva (2015). 
4 For a more detailed analysis of all these objections, see Coliva (2010: Ch. 2). 
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home right now,” based on my husband’s testimony over the phone a few 
minutes ago, together with hearing them speak on the phone and reporting 
being there. As Wittgenstein puts it, in the grammatical use of ‘I know’, the ‘I’ 
is unimportant, because that claim concerns things that everyone would 
‘know’ (as long as they are normal adult human beings, as Moore himself 
noticed in “A Defence of Common Sense”); it expresses objective certainty—
that is to say, the impossibility of doubt or of being wrong—not due to some 
form of individualistic certainty or privileged access, but due to the peculiar 
role that the propositions thereby ‘known’ play within our language games 
and epistemic practices. 
So, yes, Wittgenstein, as Maddy observes, would not object to an ordinary 
person saying that they ‘know’ that the Earth has existed for a very long time 
(OC 407). But not because that person, contrary to Moore, has the right to 
claim knowledge with respect to that hinge. (Why use a double standard like 
that?) Rather, because, as Wittgenstein puts it “I feel (rightly?) that these two 
mean to say something different” (OC 407). For Moore wants to lay claim to 
knowledge, whereas the ordinary person expresses their certainty, through 
those very same words. Such certainty is not due to philosophical scrutiny, 
but to their being brought up in a community that share that as a 
presupposition of countless language games and epistemic practices. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein recommends disambiguating and substituting the 
“grammatical” occurrences of ‘I know’ with “it stands fast for me and many 
others…” (OC 116, feststehen is the verb he proposes substituting for wissen). 
My claim is that Wittgenstein’s aim, contrary to Moore’s, was not that of 
defending common sense, but of making sense of common sense, by 
revealing the multiplicity behind the apparent uniformity: in this particular 
case, the multiplicity of what ‘I know’ could actually mean, despite the 
uniformity of those very words across very different uses. Or again, the 
multiplicity of roles and functions propositions can have, despite their 
superficial similarity—that is, despite their being propositions of the form of 
empirical ones, and despite their being propositions (in most cases) about 
empirical objects. Thus, although Wittgenstein too, like Moore, is certainly 
not against common sense, he also thinks that what passes as common sense 
is not self-explanatory or obvious, and therefore true, known and certain (as 
Moore thought of his truisms in “A Defence of Common Sense”). The aim of 
philosophy, therefore, is not that of defending it as such, or of utilizing it, as 
such, against opposite philosophical claims. The aim of philosophy, for 
Wittgenstein, is not even simply that of describing it, as if everything was 
already open to the view and clear and manifest as such. Rather, it is that of 
offering a “perspicuous (re)presentation” of it (PI 122, übersichtlichen 
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Darstellung), and this may involve going beyond simplistic views which seem 
to be deposited within it (like that I know that the Earth has existed for a 
very long time, just as I know that my kids are at home now; or that those 
two propositions play the same role in our language games and epistemic 
practices). As Maddy quotes Wittgenstein: 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because 
of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—
because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of the 
inquiry do not strike people at all. (PI 129) 
So something is hidden, after all, for Wittgenstein (or, if not hidden, at least 
blurred); and it takes a lot of philosophical acumen to see it and to see it 
right. Neither a skeptic, nor Moore, or indeed the Plain Man do possess that 
acumen, according to him. Something is hidden and yet it is already there to 
be seen by eyes whose powers are not blurred when directed at things that 
are at close distance. Being against theory, as Wittgenstein certainly was, 
even in On Certainty, does not mean to be averse to the idea that philosophy 
can actually discover something: not causes, not essences, but multiplicity 
behind uniformity. And to pursue therapy does not mean going back to a 
state of nature (or of ‘second nature’). This, as Maddy rightly says, would 
strike many as “a crimped view of the philosophical project” (Maddy 2017: 
200)—no philosophy unless one gets ill, and philosophical therapy imposed 
only to go back to where we were before catching the disease. It means, 
rather, to cure the kind of intellectual cramp that does not allow us to see 
things aright. This is a cramp we have as Plain People and that many 
philosophers have not got rid of, according to Wittgenstein. And that is what 
needs to be cured, in his view. 
And yet, to go back to Maddy’s claims about what philosophers do, or in 
fact should do: it seems to me that Wittgenstein is at least as good as 
Austin—whom Maddy greatly admires—at revealing the multiplicity lying 
behind the uniformity of our words and at using that finding for strongly 
anti-metaphysical purposes. Indeed, it is Wittgenstein, to my mind, that 
made the most to make us aware of the folly of thinking that philosophers 
are just like scientists, yet endowed of super powerful telescopes (or 
microscopes, depending on how you want to go about it), which allow them 
to investigate essences which our concepts are allegedly tracking. For those 
essences disappear once we start paying attention to the diversity of actual 
and concrete uses of words and, thus, become aware of the diversity and 
multiplicity of their meanings. 
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This kind of lesson is not just of historical interest, to me. Pluralistic 
projects are currently underway in philosophy and seem highly valuable to 
me. I have in mind the copious studies on various kinds of pluralism, such as 
alethic, logical, epistemic pluralism, or indeed on pluralism about self-
knowledge. Yet, this is not the place to elaborate on that. 
5 Conclusion 
I hope that the preceding has made clear the extent of my admiration for 
Maddy’s wonderfully rich and thought-provoking book. Although, as the 
saying goes, the devil is in the details, I would insist that our disagreements 
are local and that they should not in any way obscure the vast agreement we 
have on the broader picture. That is, on the interest of skepticism and of its 
relationship with common sense, on the importance of Moore and 
Wittgenstein, on several aspects of Moore’s strategy, on the significance—for 
philosophy—of the scientific study of vision,5 on the aim of philosophy, and 
on what philosophers do, or should do, which is certainly not either old style 
conceptual analysis, or, as Maddy calls it (2017: 214), “Gettierology.” 
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